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Abstract
While the empirical relationship between public debt and economic growth has
been well-researched, there is a gap in terms of understanding the relationship between
equity market performance and public debt. Based on propositions derived from a
theoretical model and using a quarterly unbalanced panel dataset of 56 economies in
the period 1995-2017, we examine this nexus by first estimating a threshold value of
public debt above which equity market performance is adversely affected by a change
in public debt. After that, the dynamics of equity market performance and change in
public debt are examined. We estimate the threshold level to be approximately 17.97
percent of GDP. The short-run and long-run multipliers of a one-percent increase in
public debt on equity market returns are 11.57 − 37.59 and 27.51 − 78.72 percentage
points. These dynamics appear to be different between the economies that are below
and above the estimated debt threshold.
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1 Introduction
The outbreak of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011 has drawn greater attention from
policymakers and practitioners alike to the complex nexus between the public debt market
and the equity capital market. As the estimated combined value of world financial assets
surpasses 300 percent of world GDP in 2012, the combination of the equity capital market
and public debt securities has remained the core segments of the financial markets (McKinsey,
2013). Anecdotal evidence seems to suggest that there is a significant relationship between
public debt and the equity market, as typified by analysts’ and press reports, as well as
instances when a sovereign debt rating downgrade usually triggers negative reactions in the
equity market. (Financial Times, August 6th, 2011; Financier Worldwide Limited, 2011).
Similarly, among scholars, this relationship has also often been highlighted, as seen in the
reviews of Posen (2003, 2010) on Japan’s decade-long recession, as well as reports on the
various episodes of sovereign debt restructuring (Das et al., 2012; IMF, 2012).
As shown in Figure 1, for the five years after the outbreak of the global financial crisis
(2008-12), the equity market performance of the emerging economies in Asia-Pacific was
better than for developed economies known to have sizeable public debts, such as Japan.
In addition, in Figure 2, which plots the average year-on-year returns of the headline stock
market index against the average public debt-to-GDP ratio for 62 economies, it appears
that there is a negative relationship between equity market returns and debt-to-GDP ratio.
In spite of this evidence, to our knowledge, with the exception of two atheoretical empiri-
cal studies focusing only on a limited number of countries (Gerleman, 2012, on Germany,
Portugal, and Sweden; Meme and Muturi, 2016, on Kenya), there remains a gap in the
literature due to a lack of a theoretically founded cross-country examination of the relation-
ship between equity market performance and public debt. On the one hand, studies such as
Caner et al. (2010), Checherita and Rother (2010), Kumar and Woo (2010), and Reinhart
and Rogoff (2010) establish threshold levels of public debt above which an increase in debt
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negatively affects economic growth, without accounting for the role of the equity market.1
On the other hand, studies such as Korajczyk (1996), Levine and Zervos (1998), and Pan
and Mishra (2018) focus on the nexus between the equity market and economic growth. In
this stream of the empirical finance literature, public debt is conspicuously absent. Other
studies such as Mosley and Singer (2008) and Foresti and Napolitano (2016) focus on other
peripheral issues, such as the financial market impacts of political institutions and taxation
respectively. Instead, the interactions of public debts and financial market performance tend
to be examined in theoretical macroeconomic models, such as Davig et al. (2011) and Polito
and Wickens (2015).
We attempt to fill this gap in the literature by examining the empirical relationship
between equity market performance and the level of public debt. Specifically, based on
propositions derived from a theoretical model, we first estimate a threshold value of public
debt above which equity market performance is adversely affected, using quarterly unbal-
anced panel data of 56 economies in the period 1995-2017. Next, the dynamics of equity
market performance and change in public debt are examined, which then allow for empirical-
based calculations of both the short-run and long-run effects of public debt on equity market
performance. The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Based on a selective review of
the relevant literature, Section 2 discusses potential transmission mechanisms linking public
debt to equity market performance. This then leads to the presentation of a theoretical
model in Section 3. The empirical strategy is discussed in Section 4, which is then followed
by a review of the empirically estimated results in Section 5. Section 6 concludes the paper.
1For instance, Reinhart and Rogoff (2010) is a well-cited study that documented empirical findings that
there exists a public debt threshold of 90 percent of GDP, above which economic growth was much lower.
Caner et al. (2010) established a threshold level of 77 percent public debt-to-GDP ratio above which each
additional percentage point of debt costs 0.017 percentage points of annual real growth.
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2 Literature Review: Nexus of Public Debt and Equity
Market
There are three potential transmission mechanisms linking public debt to stock market per-
formance in modern financial markets. These include: (i) the debt securities market is a
key financing channel for agents in the economy, notably the public sector; (ii) the interest
rate on public debt is the key reference rate for capital market participants. Any fluctua-
tion resulting from a change in sovereign risk profile therefore affects equity valuation and
consequently, the overall performance of the equity market; (iii) the change in the rate of
public debt accumulation serves as a signalling channel on the lack of fiscal discipline and
therefore policy credibility to investors; the responses of the latter are necessarily reflected
in their activities in the equity market. Mechanism (i) suggests a positive effect of pubic
debt issuance on equity market performance, while mechanism (ii) and (iii) imply a negative
effect of public debt on equity market performance.
2.1 Debt as a key financing channel of the economy
A popular explanation of the public debt-equity capital market relationship can be referred
to as the “crowding out” hypothesis. The issuance of public debt is often a product of
deficit financing. The increase in government expenditure funded by debt raised crowds out
private investment, which in turn adversely affects aggregate expenditure and, consequently,
economic growth. The gist of this argument is that public sector outlays– irrespective of
operating or development in nature– via domestic debt financing tend to drive up domestic
interest rates (therefore raising the cost of capital), which in turn results in credit rationing
to the private sector. In this instance, the expected excess rate of return to private capital
is lower, therefore resulting in a lower propensity to invest among private firms. Given the
endogeneity between agents’real investments and fund-raising activities in the equity capital
market (King and Levine, 1993), the crowding out of private investment will be reflected in
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a decline in the performance of the equity market index.
At the aggregate level, this feature is often captured in many general equilibrium mod-
els with public debt within the endogenous growth framework. These studies focus on the
intergenerational consequences of debt financing. More specifically, the “crowding out”hy-
pothesis is supplemented by the “Ricardian Equivalence”proposition, which suggests that,
irrespective of the method of government financing, additional public debt raised today will
be a burden paid for by future generations. Private consumers and firms therefore internal-
ize this expectation of a higher future burden and adjust their consumption and investment
decisions accordingly. The issuance of public debt will therefore “crowd out” the present
rate of capital accumulation (Diamond, 1965; Greiner, 2012). As a result, the public debt
raised indirectly weighs on future profitability of companies, hence adversely affecting their
market valuation.2
On the contrary, proceeds raised from public debt issued, if utilized effi ciently, are also
argued by scholars such as Agénor (2012) to have positive effects on the profitability of in-
vestment. These lines of argument stem primarily from the belief that debt-financed public
capital investment generates positive spillover effects to the economy. In spite of the increas-
ing participation from private investors in recent years, the role of government in driving
public capital investment, notably in strategic sectors, remains extremely important in most
developing economies, as evidenced by the dominant role of entities such as sovereign-wealth
strategic investment funds (see, for instance, Bernstein et al. 2013; Halland et al., 2016)
and government-linked companies.3 Moreover, public capital has also been shown to be
growth-enhancing via the promotion of both private investment and productivity growth
through various direct and indirect channels of the economy. A higher stock of public capi-
tal in infrastructure tends to raise the productivity of other inputs, such as labour and the
2For a comprehensive survey of the literature on the macroeconomic effects of government debt, see
Elmendorf and Mankiw (1999).
3Collectively, government-linked companies, also known as state-owned enterprises, accounted for 204
of the top 2000 listed companies in the Forbes ranking in 2011, USD2 trillion worth of equity market
capitalisation, and more than 6 million employees (Christiansen, 2011; Kowalski et al., 2013).
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stock of private capital. This reduces unit production costs, raises the expected returns on
private investment, reinforces positively the rate of private investment and, consequently in
our context, stock prices (Agénor and Moreno-Dodson, 2006; Straub, 2008).
From the perspective of capital market development, the development of a liquid gov-
ernment bonds market would also be positive for the economy: a liquid government bond
markets means there is suffi cient offering of government bonds across a range of maturities,
which is in turn key to the construction of the benchmark yield curve (which is important
for the establishment of the market-based risk-free interest rate used in equity pricing). This
synergistic relationship between the government bond and equity markets are seen in many
East Asian economies, which experienced a surge in private investment and equity market
capitalization following the establishment of a liquid debt securities market post-Asian fi-
nancial crisis in 1997 (Herring and Chatusripitak, 2000; Securities Commission Malaysia,
2011; Shim, 2012; Turner, 2012).
2.2 Sovereign debt rating risk channel
As discussed, the government bonds market is relied upon heavily in the construction of a
market-oriented benchmark yield curve, which in turn is used by investors to derive the risk-
free interest rate used in equity pricing. This critical function, coupled with the prevalence
of public debt-holdings by many of the financial institutions in modern financial markets,
makes sovereign debt yields a key risk parameter for investors. Any deterioration in sovereign
health that threatens the debt sustainability of an economy can therefore provide a source
that adversely affects equity market performance. This is especially true in an episode of
sovereign default (Angeloni and Wolff, 2012; Mink and De Haan, 2012; Acharya et al., 2014).
By definition, sovereign debt rating represents the debt service payments-paying capacity
of a country, as assessed by a rating agency. Good credit ratings of public debt indicate
low credit risk of a government, whereas a downgrade in sovereign ratings tends to reflect
a deterioration of the macroeconomic environment. As the sovereign debt rating directly
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reflects the present and future capacity of a government in fulfilling its debt obligations,
actions by rating agencies carry considerable information. For instance, the significance of
the sovereign debt rating-related risk channel was in full display in the midst of the European
sovereign debt crisis in 2011. The sovereign debt risk (as proxied by the credit default swap
(CDS) spread) and annual stock market index returns for five of the troubled European
peripheral economies (Spain, Italy, Portugal, Ireland, and Greece) are illustrated in Figure
3. In addition, the correlation between the sovereign CDS spread and the stock market
index for the five economies has a value of at least -0.507, as shown in Table 1. Indeed,
most empirical studies have employed some sort of duration- or event-study methodology
to investigate the impact of sovereign rating changes on equity market performance, and
found a negative downgrade in sovereign debt rating to affect stock market returns [see,
for instance, Brooks et al. (2004), Martell (2005), Klimaviciene (2011), and Michaelides et
al. (2012)]. In addition, the change in sovereign rating grades is also shown empirically
to influence valuations and transmit asymmetrically to the equity market returns in other
countries (Ferreira and Gama, 2007). Collectively, these appear to suggest the existence of
a sovereign debt rating risk channel.
2.3 Signalling channel on the lack of fiscal discipline
In addition to the two mechanisms discussed, an additional channel linking public debt to
equity market performance is based on the signalling theory of Ross (1977). Equity market
performance often builds on the confidence of market participants towards the health of an
economy. public debt issuance, irrespective of whether it brings about positive (in the case
of a high—profile infrastructure project-based debt issuance) or negative signals (see recent
European experience), can serve as a powerful signalling device. Often, the national debt
size (measured by the debt-to-GDP ratio) can be interpreted as a “debt structure” that
signals not only the health of an economy, but also the fiscal discipline of the government.
For instance, a permanent increase in public debt for a regime with a lack of history of
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fiscal discipline can send a negative signal to the market as it is expected to lead to higher
future taxes. Similarly, in the context of external debts borrowed by the government, a rapid
increase can lead to a spike in the risk premium associated with foreign borrowings of the
private sector, which in turn raises the overall cost of borrowing and reduces profitability of
firms listed in the domestic bourse (Bhandari et al., 1990).
This argument is best seen in the context of the European sovereign debt crisis in 2011. In
spite of the existence of supranational fiscal rules as established under the Maastricht Treaty,
frequent breaches of treaty obligations by member economies had sent multiple negative
signals of fiscal irresponsibility to the markets over the years.4 Due to this lack of fiscal
discipline, many of the major European economies have deficits and national debt levels
that are well above the Maastricht criteria, and therefore limited fiscal space. Following
the initial outbreak of financial problems in Greece, investors quickly lost confidence in the
sovereign health of European governments, which led to a contagion effect and disastrous
performance across the regional equity markets (Arezki et al., 2011).5
3 Theoretical Model
Our empirical specification is motivated by the following theoretical model economy, which
consists of a representative consumer, a continuum mass of firms producing differentiated
varieties, and a public debt-issuing government. In this simplified economy, equities and
public debt are assumed to be solely owned by an external investor, who values equity
4Members of the European Union (EU) signed the Maastricht Treaty in February 1992, and the treaty
came into force on November 1, 1993. The treaty outlined five convergence criteria that EU member states are
required to comply with in order to adopt the new Euro currency, with two of the main pledges being limits
related to fiscal deficit and debt levels. However, neither the treaty nor the European Growth and Stability
Pact (EGSP) stipulated regulations or enforceable mechanisms that would hold member states accountable
in case of any breach of treaty obligations. As such, a significant number of EU member states repeatedly
breached the fiscal deficit and general government debt limits of 3 and 60 percent of GDP respectively.
5Indeed, the financial problems of Greece had become so severe then that the fear of banking contagion
across Europe effectively ruled out a restructuring of the sovereign debt. This was due to the large exposure
to Greece of several major banks in France and Germany. Consequently, the European Central Bank and
the International Monetary Fund had to commit an estimated total of EURO 80 and 30 billion of bilateral
loans and stand-by facilities respectively in the period from mid-2010 through mid-2013.
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using a standard capital-asset pricing model (CAPM), while viewing public debt returns as
risk-free.
Based on the theoretical framework of studies such as Brambilla (2009) and Lim (2018),
the representative consumer in the economy consumes a composite product, qt, which consists
of a continuum of differentiated varieties, [0,M ], as in
qt =
{∫ M
0
[qjt]
(θ−1)/θdj
}θ/(θ−1)
, (1)
where θ > 1 is the elasticity of substitution across the different varieties, and qjt is the
quantity of type j variety. Taking after-tax income, (1 − τ)Yt, and prices as given, cost
minimization with respect to each category results in the demand function for each variety
j as
qjt = (
Pjt
Pt
)−θqt, (2)
where Pjt is the price of variety j, and Pt the aggregate price index of all varieties, given by
the Dixit-Stiglitz form of:
Pt =
{∫ M
0
(Pjt)
1−θdj
}1/(1−θ)
, (3)
which implies Ptqt =
∫M
0
Pjtqjtdj.
Consumers are assumed to spend all of their after-tax income on the composite product,
hence qt = (1 − τ t)Yt. Substituting this into (2), we derive the demand function for each
variety j as
qjt = (
Pjt
Pt
)−θ(1− τ t)Yt. (4)
On the production side, there is a continuum of firmsN , indexed by n ∈ [0, N ], producing
theM varieties, which are sold in a monopolistically competitive market. For simplicity, each
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firm produces exclusively a variety type j, as in
M =
∫ N
0
m(n)dn. (5)
In each period t, each firm n learns its production function and cost profile. Given that
each firm is small, all firms take the aggregate demand and aggregate price index as given.
Each firm n then sets the price for the differentiated variety j produced, taking unit cost,
cjt as given. The production cost function for each variety j produced by firm n therefore
equals
Cnjt(q
n
jt) = c
n
jtq
n
jt, (6)
where cnj,t is the unit marginal cost of variety j for firm n, and fixed cost is assumed to be zero.
Specifically, each firm n chooses prices so as to maximize variable profits, Πnjt = (P
n
jt−cnjt)qnjt,
subject to the demand functions (4), yielding the first-order condition of standard constant
mark-up pricing,
P njt =
θ
θ − 1c
n
jt. (7)
In a symmetric equilibrium, Pjt = P njt ∀n. Using (7), the indirect profit of a typical firm
is given by
Πt =
1
θ
(Pjt)
1−θP θt [(1− τ)Yt]. (8)
To capture the role of fiscal policy in such a multi-sectoral model, using a similar specifi-
cation to Baxter and King (1993) and Polito and Wickens (2015), the government assumes
a simple form in that it maintains the following budget constraint:
τ tYt = Gt −∆Dt + rGt Dt, (9)
where the difference between taxes and general government expenditure, Gt, is financed by
new issuance of public debt, ∆Dt = Dt − Dt−1, net of interest payment, rGt Dt. Without
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explicitly introducing a Central Bank, we assume the government sets the interest rate, rGt ,
for its public debts using a Taylor-type (1993) policy rule,
rGt = r̄ + θπ(πt − πt−1) + θY (Yt − Y ∗t ), (10)
where θπ, θY ∈ (0, 1), r̄ is some constant benchmark rate, πt − πt−1 is the change in the
inflation rate, and Y ∗t is the potential output level. The specification is in line with the
theoretical model in studies such as Moura and Carvalho (2010) and Agénor and Alper
(2012). Substituting (9) into (8) and rearranging terms, we can derive the expression:
Yt =
θΠt
(Pjt)1−θP θt
−∆Dt + rGt Dt +Gt. (11)
Lastly, for the external investor, the pricing of equities of firms in this economy is based
on a standard CAPM equation of
ret = r
G
t + β(r
m
t − rGt ), (12)
where β is the market beta, and rmt is the market return, which can be interpreted as the
overall return of a world index, such as MSCI World Index. As mentioned, the investor views
the public debt securities’returns as risk-free, and therefore treats rGt as the riskfree rate.
To derive the key theoretical equation underpinning a testable proposition, first as-
sume agents’ inflation expectations in the economy evolve according to the well-known
expectations-augmented Phillips Curve (EAPC) in the tradition of Phelps (1967). Specifi-
cally, we have
πt − πt−1 = δ(Ut − U∗) + πet , (13)
where δ > 0, Ut−U∗ denotes the cyclical deviation in unemployment, and πet some expected
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inflation level. Substituting (11) and (13) into (10), we have
rGt = r̄ + θπ(πt − πt−1) + θY [
θΠt
(Pjt)1−θP θt
−∆Dt + rGt Dt +Gt]− Y ∗t ,
which is the equivalent of the MP curve in our model [see Romer (2000) for an elaboration
of the IS-MP framework]. After some rearrangement of terms, we have
rGt (1− θYDt) = r̄ + θπδ(Ut − U∗) + θππet +
θY θΠt
(Pjt)1−θP θt
− θY ∆Dt + θYGt − Y ∗t . (14)
Substituting this into (12), we derive an expression linking equity-market return as a
function of public debt,
ret = (1− β)
[
r̄ + θπδ(Ut − U∗) + θππet + θY θΠt(Pjt)1−θP θt − θY (Dt −Dt−1) + θYGt − Y
∗
t
(1− θYDt)
]
+ βrmt .
(15)
Proposition 1: The equity market returns of an economy is a function of public debt,
the expected inflation rate, the unemployment rate, and the world market returns of typical
global investors.
Equation (15) shows two different channels whereby public debts can have an effect on
the returns on equity. θY (Dt − Dt−1) in the numerator can be interpreted as a source of
the combined crowding-out, sovereign debt rating risk and fiscal policy signalling channels,
while the term in the denominator denotes the financial-market scale effect which positively
influences the equity-market returns. This trade-off essentially suggests that there is a non-
linear relationship between equity market returns and public debt levels. Differentiating ret
with respect to Dt, we have
∂ret
∂Dt
=
θY [r̄ + θπδ(Ut − U∗) + θππet + θY θΠt(Pjt)1−θP θt − θY (Dt −Dt−1) + θYGt − Y
∗
t ]− (1− θYDt)θY
(1− θYDt)2
,
(16)
which is ambiguous in sign, and suggests the potential existence of a threshold debt level
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that leads to structural differences in the relationship.
Proposition 2: There exists a threshold level of public debt above which the effects of an
increase in public debt would negatively affect the equity index returns of the national bourse
of an economy.
4 Empirical Strategy
Based on (15), and given that the real profitability terms, (θY θΠt)/[(Pjt)1−θP θt ] can be
proxied by the real GDP level (by definition, the latter is the sum of the gross value-added
in the economy), an empirically testable dynamic form is represented by:
dlindexkt = α0 + α1dldebtk,t + α2dlyk,t + α3r
m
t (17)
+α4π
CPI
k,t + α5Uk,t +
L∑
l=1
ψlXl,k,t + µkt + ukt,
where k(t) is a country (time, in quarterly frequency) index; dlindexkt is the equity market
index returns (in first difference of logarithms), dldebtk,t is the change in public debt level,
dlyk,t is the real GDP growth rate, πCPIk,t is the consumer price inflation rate, Uk,t is the
unemployment rate, and rmt is a proxy for the world market returns of a typical global
investors. {Xl,jt}Ll=1 denotes the set of control variables that influences country-specific
equity returns, which include government spending, as well as other variables not explicitly
included in (15). Lastly, µkt captures time-invariant country-specific effects, while ukt is the
error term. While equation (17) presents a contemporaneous relationship between changes in
equity returns and public debt, to control for time-series persistency-induced endogeneity, a
formal model selection criterion is used to evaluate the optimal number of lags when analyzing
the dynamics between stock market returns, public debt size, and real GDP growth.
Prior to the dynamic analysis, given that Proposition 2 indicates the presence of a non-
linear threshold level effect of public debt that influences the dynamics between equity returns
and public debt, we first estimate (17) to empirically identify a “turning point”/threshold
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debt level, using the debt-to-GDP ratio in place of actual debt levels.6 This would then
allow us to conduct split-sample analysis when implementing the dynamic panel estimation.
In terms of data and measurement, our data form an unbalanced panel that consists of 56
economies in the period 1995Q1 to 2017Q4. The summary statistics of the data and variables
are presented in Table 2. For the key variables, the headline stock index and the real GDP
figures of the 56 economies are obtained from Bloomberg. For the public debt variables, the
quarterly public sector debt statistical database jointly produced by the World Bank and
International Monetary Fund (IMF) is used. Specifically, we measure public debt as the
gross value of all debt instruments across all maturities denominated in USD. Given that
some developing economies in our sample do not voluntarily share their early-years’debt
data with the World Bank and IMF, we supplement with debt statistics obtained from the
respective central bank or ministry of finance in these economies.7 For consistency, all GDP
and debt values are first deflated using country-level deflator to real terms, then converted
to USD.
For the other independent variables, the level of the MSCI World Index is obtained
from Bloomberg, with its first difference derived to proxy for rmt in (15).
8 For government
spending, the growth rate of real government consumption is used, consistent with (15) and
studies such as Foresti and Napolitano (2016). For the remaining two variables in (15), the
6The indentification of a turning point based on the debt-to-GDP ratio instead of the level of debt is
consistent with endogenous growth theories in that, any long-term threshold debt level must be a stationary
variable in a long-run balanced growth equilibrium (BGE). While the level of debt is a growing variable, the
debt-to-GDP ratio would exhibit more stable properties. In addition, this also allows us to avoid potential
measurement bias associated with the different units of measurement or currency denomination for debts.
See Agénor and Montiel (2008) for a formal definition of the BGE.
7For example, Jordan’s public debt is compiled using its Ministry of Finance’s Public Debts Bulletin;
the debt statistics of Philippines are compiled from the various editions of the National Government Debt
Monitor published by the Bureau of the Treasury, Philippines; the central government debt data for Trinidad
and Tobago is compiled from the publications of its Central Bank; the public debt statistics for Tunisia are
compiled from the Central Bank of Tunisia; and for Uruguay the debt statistics are obtained from Banco
Central del Uruguay’s quarterly Sovereign Debt Reports and Debt Indicators; for Ukraine the debt statistics
published by the State Statistics Service of Ukraine are used.
8In our empirical analysis, it turns out that, once either the level or first difference of the MSCI World
Index is included as an independent variable (the former measures global sentiment, while the latter is a
proxy for world market returns) the domestic value traded is insignificant throughout the different variations
of the regression.
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expected inflation rate is measured by the CPI inflation rate (consistent with Davig et al.,
2011), while the unemployment rate is obtained directly from the relevant national statistical
agencies. For the other variables, money supply growth is included in line with the findings
in studies as such as Levine and Zervos (1998) and Alexandre and Bacao (2006). In addition,
given the significance of the fiscal budget in our theoretical framework, three country-specific
binary variables are created to control for the impact of a fiscal rule (a dummy variable
for countries with a balanced budget rule9), resource-endowments (a dummy variable for
countries defined as resource-rich developing economies by the IMF10), and an interaction
term for European economies with a fiscal debt rule (to allow for the fact that most European
economies, by definition of the Maastricht criteria, have a fiscal debt rule in place). In our
view, these additional control variables employed are more effective than mere separation
of countries into low- and high-income economies, as this approach allows for interpretation
of the estimated coeffi cients across all sample countries irrespective of the heterogeneous
characteristics of individual economies.
5 Results
5.1 Threshold debt-to-GDP ratio
As mentioned, in line with Proposition 2, we first seek to empirically estimate a “turning
point”/threshold debt level using the debt-to-GDP ratio in place of the actual debt levels.
To analyze and identify a turning point, the empirical inverted-U specification of Cecchetti
and Kharroubi (2012) is adopted in favour of the threshold least squares approach imple-
mented by Caner et al. (2010). The rationale of the choice is due to the former being a
study that assesses the impact of finance on growth, which in our view is a more appropri-
9See Schaechter et al. (2012) for the definition of a balanced budget rule, as well as a classification by
countries.
10See Baunsgaard et al. (2012) for the IMF’s classification of a resource-rich developing country, as well
as a general discussion on the importance of fiscal rules in the fiscal frameworks of these economies.
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ate methodological reference in examining the nexus between public debt and stock market
performance, which are both financial variables. Another alternative is the non-linear gen-
eralized methods of moments estimator of Hansen (1982), which is not used due to it being
relatively restrictive in allowing for additional control variables to be included. The obser-
vation of a “hunchback”pattern based on the graphical plot of the full sample for the two
variables (national stock market headline index returns and public debt-to-nominal GDP
ratio) in Figure 4 supports the use of the inverted-U estimation approach.
We employ a random-effects generalized least-square (GLS) estimator, which unlike a
fixed-effects estimator, allows for out-of-sample prediction and therefore the estimation of
a turning point. For robustness, two measures of stock market index returns [continuous-
quarterly returns (first-differenced) and discrete year-on-year returns] are used. In terms
of independent variables, apart from the primary variables of interest (public debt-to-GDP
ratio and its squared term), empirical estimation is carried out using different combinations
of control variables, including the variables stated in Proposition 1. The results of the
20 variations regressed are presented in Table 3. In addition, for further robustness, we
also estimate the different variations using a fixed-effects estimator in Table 4, on top of
the three binary variables already introduced to control for country-specific effects. The
majority of the estimated coeffi cients for the public debt-to-GDP ratio and public debt-
to-GDP ratio squared term are statistically significant. All the estimated coeffi cients for
the former are found to be positive, while the estimated coeffi cients for the latter are all
negative, hence consistent with the inverted-U proposition. With the continuous-quarter
returns as dependent variable, a statistically significant estimated threshold debt level is in
the range of 18.6 − 28.0 percent of GDP. With the relatively practitioner-oriented discrete
year-on-year returns as dependent variable, the statistically significant estimated threshold
debt level is in the range of 13.7−21.9 percent of GDP. With the fixed-effects estimator, the
range is estimated to be 11.0 − 18.5 percent of GDP. On average, these give an estimated
debt threshold of 17.97 percent, which is applied later to conduct split-sample analysis of
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the dynamics between equity market performance and public debts.11
5.2 Dynamic Panel Estimation
Having empirically identified a debt threshold that is in consistent with Proposition 2, the
dynamic effects of public debt on stock market performance are then investigated. Before
the estimation, standard empirical procedures to examine the time series properties of the
public debt series are performed. Inspection of the autocorrelation coeffi cients for the lags
of the logarithm of the public debt series of the sample countries shows the presence of
an autoregressive (AR) process in the debt variables.12 To account for this time series
persistence, a formal panel unit root test developed by Im et al. (2003) (commonly known
as the Im-Pesaran-Shin Test) is implemented. Unlike other panel unit-root tests, the Im-
Pesaran-Shin Test allows for panel-specific AR parameters to be specified and tested on
demeaned and unbalanced panel data series. The resulting conclusion from the diagnostic
tests is that the public debt-to-GDP ratio variable is trend stationary at the 5 percent level,
whereas the debt level variable for all panels is found to contain unit roots. This requires
the execution of the first differencing procedure to transform the time-dependent debt level
variable into a stationary debt series, hence effectively filtering out the first-order serial
correlation. Next, based on repeated inspections of cross-correlograms, we notice correlations
across time between public debt and stock market index performance, up to potentially two to
four quarters. The magnitude of the cross-correlation values are nonetheless moderate. This
provides an initial “yardstick range”to guide decision-making on model selection. Adding
real GDP growth as a third key variable, we then use formal information criterion tests
for model selection to assess model fit (based on randomly selected sample countries), and
11In an earlier draft of this study, an estimation based on nominal returns found the range of estimated
threshold debt levels to be 84.8− 106.7 percent of GDP.
12As in standard practice of time series analysis, the autocorrelation functions (public debt-to-GDP ratio
and logarithm of public debt) and cross-correlograms (for public debt-to-GDP ratio and stockmarket index)
are also inspected for individual sample countries. They are not presented here to save space.
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conclude that a lag length of two is selected.13
In summary, the model-selection results suggest that the first and the second lags of
equity market index returns (changes in the logarithm of the real index), the change in
log-public debt (in real terms), and real GDP growth are included in the empirical model
specification. Other control variables included are in line with Proposition 1. For robustness,
in addition to the standard panel estimators of fixed-effects (FE), random-effects (RE), and
population-average model, the dynamic panel estimation technique of system generalized
method-of-moment proposed by Arellano and Bond (1991) is also implemented in two vari-
ations: (1) public debt and real GDP growth are treated as exogenous; (2) public debt and
real GDP are both treated as endogenous to the system. The additional testing of these two
variations addresses the issue of potential endogeneity bias, and further serves a robustness
purpose. An additional consideration associated with the estimator concerns the choice of
the number of lags of the endogenous variables used as instruments, namely, the “too many
instruments”problem highlighted by Roodman (2009). An excessive number of instruments
can result in overfitting of the instrumented variables, therefore biasing the results. Varia-
tion (1) essentially treats both public debt and real GDP growth as exogenous, and hence
represents a fit with a minimal number of instruments, whereas (2) better accounts for en-
dogeneity, at the cost of greater number of instruments. While the choice of the number of
lagged variables included (two) is guided by model-selection criteria in standard time-series
literature (described earlier), we further apply the Arellano and Bond (1991) test for serial
correlation up to two lags for further robustness. In addition, for the two GMM estimators,
we also follow the rule of thumb approach of Agénor and Neanidis (2015) and Lim and Raza
(2017), where the number of instruments is kept to less than the number of countries.
The estimation results based on (17) using the full sample are presented in Table 5.
The estimated coeffi cient of current period public debt change is found to be statistically
13The formal test statistics are not presented to save space. Both the relatively stricter Hannan-Quinn
and Schwarz information criteria identified a lag of two as the best-model fit, while the Akaike information
criterion highlighted a lag of five and seven in the two different versions of the test.
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significant in all versions of the regression, and the variable seems to assert a positive contem-
poraneous effect [also known as the short-run (SR) multiplier] in the range of 11.57− 37.59
percentage points, on the returns of the national equity market index. Nonetheless, the lag
terms are not statistically significant, suggesting a lack of persistent effects from the change
in public debt to equity market performance. This is likely due to: (i) the real macro-
economic conditions, such as real GDP growth and its lag terms, having greater statistical
significance; (ii) the inclusion of the returns of MSCI World Index having “mopped up”most
of the inter-temporal variations in stock prices; or (iii) the inclusion of the level and threshold
effect of public debt (the debt-to-GDP ratio and its squared terms) having accounted for
some of the variations in equity returns that are attributable to public debt. To quantify the
overall dynamic impacts of public debt changes on stock market index returns, the long-run
(LR) multipliers are also calculated.14 The LR multiplier of public debt changes is estimated
to range from 27.51 − 78.72 percentage points, hence suggesting that the change in public
debt is found to bring about a positive impact on the performance of the national stock
market index. In addition, at least two (three) out of the three non-debt variables posited
in Proposition 1 (rmt , π
CPI
k,t , Uk,t) are statistically significant in all (three) regressions. These
therefore provide empirical support for Proposition 1. Interestingly, the estimated results
using the two GMM-estimator-based regressions are largely consistent with those in the sim-
ple panel regressions, notably the positive relationship between growth of public debt and
stock market performance. Given that the third-to-fifth period lags of the variables are used
as instruments, these perhaps reflect a relatively stable (over time) causality from positive
expectations driving the stock market performance, while simultaneously allowing countries
to borrow more.
Next, for further robustness, split-sample estimation is implemented based on the esti-
mated threshold of 0.1797, with the results presented in Table 6. Given the separation of
observations, we no longer need to include the two debt-to-GDP ratio terms, as in Table
14Given equation of yt = β0+ β1yt−1+ β2yt−2+ β3xt+ β4xt−1+ β5xt−2, the short-run impact multiplier
of xt on yt is just β3, while the long-run multiplier is calculated as (β3 + β4 + β5)/(1− β1 − β2).
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5. This appears to result in greater statistical significance of the estimated coeffi cients of
the lagged variables of public debt. In all six regressions presented, in addition to the
contemporaneous term, the one-quarter lag term is statistically significant too. For the
economies with low public debt levels, the change in public debt appears to have relatively
positive effects on equity market performance. The estimated SR and LR multiplier for these
economies are 66.09− 70.1 and 98.4− 101.93 percentage points respectively, whereas for the
group with debt-to-GDP ratio above the threshold, the estimated SR and LR multipliers are
22.05− 22.73 and 17.75− 19.27 percentage points respectively. Apart from the difference in
magnitude, the key difference between these two groups appears to be the the one-quarter
lag dynamic. For the former, the positive financial-market scale effect on the equity-market
returns is not only larger but more persistent too, whereas for the latter the negative effect
associated with the combined crowding-out, sovereign debt rating risk and fiscal policy sig-
nalling channels outweigh the positive mechanism. However, as seen in the LR multipliers,
the net long-run effect of public debt on equity market performance appears to be positive.
Last but not least, the estimated coeffi cients of the MSCI world returns, the unem-
ployment rate, and the CPI inflation rate remain mostly significant (albeit at a weaker
significance level for the latter). These therefore provide further support for Proposition 1,
in that the real returns in the equity market of an economy are a function of public debt, the
unemployment rate, the expected inflation rate, and world market returns of typical global
investors.
6 Conclusions
Ever since the large-scale governmental bailout of the private sectors in the United States
(Veronesi and Zingales, 2010) and European economies, the public debt-equity market nexus
has become an interesting topic of concrete policy significance. Based on propositions derived
from a theoretical model and using a quarterly unbalanced panel dataset of 56 economies in
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the period 1995-2017, we examine this nexus by first estimating a threshold value of public
debt above which equity market performance is adversely affected by a change in public
debt. After that, the dynamics of equity market performance and change in public debt
are examined, which then allow for empirical-based calculations of both the short-run and
long-run effects of public debt on equity market performance. We estimated the threshold
level to be approximately 17.97 percent of GDP. The full-sample SR multiplier of a one-
percent increase in public debt on equity market performance appears to be 11.57 − 37.59
percentage points, while the LR multiplier is in the range of 27.51−78.72 percentage points.
These dynamics appear to be different between the economies that are below and above the
estimated debt threshold. For the former, the positive financial-market scale effect on the
equity-market returns is not only larger but more persistent too, whereas for the latter the
negative effect associated with the combined crowding-out, sovereign debt rating risk and
fiscal policy signalling channels outweigh the positive mechanism. However, as seen in the
LR multipliers, the net long-run effect of public debt on equity market performance appears
to be positive.
For future studies, given the inherent heterogeneity of the different economies and their
financial systems, a tedious yet potentially fruitful exercise of repeated application of un-
restricted vector autoregression (VAR) and Granger causality on these key variables (real
GDP growth, public debt growth, and stock market index performance) for each individual
economy can be studied to truly understand the causation flows for these economies. On the
other hand, for future contributions on the theoretical front, a Bayesian-estimation based
study using a dynamic stochastic general equilibrium (DSGE) model built on our theoretical
framework may also be warranted if the economic stabilization properties associated with
the public debt-equity market nexus is of interest.
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Correlation
-0.913
-0.908
-0.507
-0.657
-0.624
Variables Observation Mean Std dev. Min Max
Government debt (in USD billion) 4,809             737.2 2,469.0 0.0 26,434.2
Real GDP growth rate (in %) 4,916            3.3 4.0 -19.6 33.7
Debt-to-GDP ratio              4,808 58.4 35.3 4.8 240.1
Stock market index value              4,870 6,872.2 12,103.1 17.9 115,333.0
CPI inflation rate (in %)              5,129 6.8 42.1 -8.9 2,019.6
Unemploymeny rate (in %)              4,961 8.1 4.7 0.5 30.4
Money supply growth (in %)              4,925 9.7 17.4 -73.8 280.9
Real government consumption growth (%)              4,836 3.6 9.3 -42.8 77.3
MSCI world index              5,152 1,243.5 335.2 644.7 2,103.5
Note: The data used form an unbalanced panel, covering a sample of 56 economies. These economies include Australia, Austria, 
Belgium, Brazil, Bulgaria, Canada, China, Czech Republic, Denmark, Estonia, Finland, France, Germany, Greece, Hungary, 
Iceland, Indonesia, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Japan, Jordan, Republic of Korea, Latvia, Lithuania, Luxembourg, Malaysia, Mexico, 
Morocco, Netherlands, New Zealand, Nigeria, Norway, Pakistan, Peru, Philippines, Poland, Portugal, Romania, Russia, Singapore, 
Slovakia, Slovenia, South Africa, Spain, Sri Lanka, Sweden, Switzerland, Thailand, Trinidad and Tobago, Tunisia, Turkey, 
Ukraine, United Kingdom, United States, and Uruguay.
Table 2 : Summary Statistics of Variables
Table 1
Correlations Between Sovereign CDS Spread and Stockmarket Index for Selected European Economies
Index
Spain - IBEX 30 Index
Italy- FTSE MIB 40 Index
Portugal - PS I20 Index
Ireland - ISEQ Index
Greece - ASE Index
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Government debt-to-GDP ratio 0.0255c 0.0848b 0.0678a 0.0271c 0.0472c 0.0035 0.0668a 0.0227 0.0515b 0.0043 0.1191b 0.2196a 0.3255a 0.2150a 0.2638a 0.1455b 0.3174a 0.1925a 0.2805a 0.1562
(0.0141) (0.0351) (0.0192) (0.0160) (0.0242) (0.0164) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0229) (0.0200) (0.0605) (0.0551) (0.0837) (0.0540) (0.1007) (0.0675) (0.0784) (0.0635) (0.0943) (0.0757)
Government debt-to-GDP ratio squared -0.0107 -0.0450a -0.0281a -0.0070 -0.0232c -0.0008 -0.0302a -0.0064 -0.0288b -0.0021 -0.0429 -0.0601b -0.1176a -0.0625b -0.1098b -0.0462 -0.1186a -0.0532c -0.1231b -0.0519
(0.0075) (0.0165) (0.0109) (0.0073) (0.0145) (0.0089) (0.0107) (0.0081) (0.0100) (0.0140) (0.0338) (0.0260) (0.0420) (0.0262) (0.0560) (0.0405) (0.0408) (0.0304) (0.0539) (0.0434)
Real GDP growth - 0.1800a 0.1392a 0.2026a 0.1341b 0.2184a 0.1335b 0.2281a -0.0035 0.1456b - 2.9147a 2.6319a 2.8868a 2.7556a 3.0953a 2.7248a 2.9787a 2.2220a 2.6161a
(0.0031) (0.0531) (0.0531) (0.0593) (0.0000) (0.0639) (0.0676) (0.0770) (0.0733) (0.2889) (0.2772) (0.2828) (0.2540) (0.2708) (0.2616) (0.2845) (0.2562) (0.2894)
MSCI World index (level) - - 0.0452a - 0.0599a - 0.0491a - 0.0673a - - - 0.1909a - 0.2422a - 0.2116a - 0.2777a -
(0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0082) (0.0305) (0.0282) (0.0300) (0.0307)
MSCI World index (returns) - - - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - - - -0.0000c - -0.0000c - -0.0000 - 0.0000a
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Inflation rate - - - - -0.0027a -0.0017b - - -0.0033a -0.0025b - - - - -0.0095a -0.0048 - - -0.0107a -0.0074c
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0024) (0.0030) (0.0029) (0.0039)
Unemployment rate - - - - 0.0021a 0.0020a - - 0.0025a 0.0020a - - - - 0.0090a 0.0106a - - 0.0097a 0.0101a
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0027) (0.0029) (0.0024) (0.0027)
Government Consumption Growth - - - - - - -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0006 - - - - - - 0.0006 -0.0003 0.00027 -0.0008
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0010) (0.0012) (0.0011) (0.0014)
Money Supply Growth - - - - - - - - 0.00029 0.00023 - - - - - - - - 0.0023a 0.0023a
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0008) (0.0009)
- - - - - - 0.0115b 0.0062 0.0138c 0.00644 - - - - - - 0.0321c -0.0132 0.0440c -0.012
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0071) (0.0048) (0.0186) (0.0219) (0.0247) (0.0248)
EU country with Debt Rule - - - - - - -0.0126b -0.0040 -0.0291a -0.0153a - - - - - - 0.00622 0.03225 -0.0534b -0.0064
(0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0084) (0.0058) (0.0197) (0.0201) (0.0256) (0.0222)
Resource-rich country - - - - - - -0.0068 0.0048 -0.0170b -0.0005 - - - - - - -0.0162 0.0146 -0.0597c -0.0160
(0.0054) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0085) (0.0238) (0.0331) (0.0314) (0.0401)
21.1 18.6 20.7 12.9 24.6 11.1 22.6 14.0 28.0 23.8 18.0 13.7 18.1 14.5 20.8 15.9 18.7 13.8 21.9 16.6
Number of Countries 56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        
Number of Observations 4,579    4,514    4,514    4,514    4,454    4,454    4,375    4,375    4,239    4,239    4,454    4,402    4,402    4,402    4,350    4,350    4,284    4,284    4,170    4,170    
Wald LR test (P-value) 0.144 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.038 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
Parantheses include vce robust standard errors; superscript (a) indicates significance at 1%, (b) at 5%, and (c) at 10%.
* Turning points derived from statistically significant estimates are in bold.
Estimated threshold/turning point for 
government debt to GDP ratio (in %)*
Table 3:  Threshold estimation for the relationship of equity market index returns and government Debt-to-GDP ratio, Continuous-Quarter vs Annual Returns
 Panel Random-effects GLS regression
Dependent variables:
Index returns, Y-o-Y (from same quarter previous year)
Country with Balanced Budget Rule 
Index returns, continuous-quarter (from previous quarter)
Independent variables: (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) (16) (17) (18) (19) (20)
Government debt-to-GDP ratio 0.0255c 0.0848b 0.0678a 0.0271c 0.0472c 0.0035 0.0668a 0.0227 0.0515b 0.0043 0.1311a 0.1412a 0.1580a 0.1580a 0.0993 0.1205a 0.1510a 0.1571a 0.0914c 0.1190a
(0.0141) (0.0351) (0.0192) (0.0160) (0.0242) (0.0164) (0.0179) (0.0177) (0.0229) (0.0200) (0.0346) (0.0327) (0.0422) (0.0343) (0.0623) (0.0415) (0.0359) (0.0319) (0.0496) (0.0349)
Government debt-to-GDP ratio squared -0.0107 -0.0450a -0.0281a -0.0070 -0.0232c -0.0008 -0.0302a -0.0064 -0.0288b -0.0021 -0.0390b -0.0409b -0.0550a -0.0349b -0.0528 -0.0298 -0.0560a -0.0348b -0.0495 -0.0264
(0.0075) (0.0165) (0.0109) (0.0073) (0.0145) (0.0089) (0.0107) (0.0081) (0.0100) (0.0140) (0.0168) (0.0154) (0.0194) (0.0142) (0.0336) (0.0217) (0.0184) (0.0143) (0.0325) (0.0211)
Real GDP growth - 0.1800a 0.1392a 0.2026a 0.1341b 0.2184a 0.1335b 0.2281a -0.0035 0.1456b - 0.1990a 0.1337b 0.2293a 0.1166 0.2483a 0.1031 0.2503a -0.0757 0.14842
(0.0031) (0.0531) (0.0531) (0.0593) (0.0000) (0.0639) (0.0676) (0.0770) (0.0733) (0.0728) (0.0648) (0.0793) (0.0768) (0.0787) (0.0818) (0.0842) (0.0947) (0.0927)
MSCI World index (level) - - 0.0452a - 0.0599a - 0.0491a - 0.0673a - - - 0.0533a - 0.0852a 0.0659a - 0.1078a -
(0.0076) (0.0073) (0.0079) (0.0082) (0.0139) (0.0000) (0.0196) (0.0111)
MSCI World index (returns) - - - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - - - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - 0.0000a - 0.0000a
(0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000) (0.0000)
Inflation rate - - - - -0.0027a -0.0017b - - -0.0033a -0.0025b - - - - -0.0038a -0.0025b - - -0.0046a -0.0037b
(0.0007) (0.0008) (0.0009) (0.0012) (0.0009) (0.0097) (0.0108) (0.0017)
Unemployment rate - - - - 0.0021a 0.0020a - - 0.0025a 0.0020a - - - - 0.0068a 0.0042a - - 0.0060a 0.0034a
(0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0007) (0.0006) (0.0013) (0.0011) (0.0013) (0.0010)
Government Consumption Growth - - - - - - -0.0003 -0.0007 0.0000 -0.0006 - - - - - - -0.0002 -0.0005 0.0000 -0.0004
(0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0005) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006) (0.0006)
Money Supply Growth - - - - - - - - 0.00029 0.00023 - - - - - - - - 0.0004 0.0003
(0.0002) (0.0002) (0.0003) (0.0003)
- - - - - - 0.0115b 0.0062 0.0138c 0.00644 - - - - - - -0.0059 0.00339 -0.0014 0.0013
(0.0045) (0.0045) (0.0071) (0.0048) (0.0084) (0.0086) (0.0159) (0.0115)
EU country with Debt Rule - - - - - - -0.0126b -0.0040 -0.0291a -0.0153a - - - - - - -0.0083 -0.0035 -0.0197 -0.0113
(0.0049) (0.0043) (0.0084) (0.0058) (0.0123) (0.0124) (0.0197) (0.0175)
Resource-rich country** - - - - - - -0.0068 0.0048 -0.0170b -0.0005 - - - - - - - - - -
(0.0054) (0.0068) (0.0068) (0.0085)
21.1 18.6 20.7 12.9 24.6 11.1 22.6 14.0 28.0 23.8 14.9 14.5 17.4 11.0 26.6 12.4 18.5 11.1 27.1 11.1
Number of Countries 56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        56        
Number of Observations 4,579    4,514    4,514    4,514    4,454    4,454    4,375    4,375    4,239    4,239    4,579    4,514    4,514    4,514    4,454    4,454    4,375    4,375    4,239    4,239    
Wald LR test (for RE) /F-test (for FE) 0.144 0.010 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000
[P-value]
Parantheses include vce robust standard errors; superscript (a) indicates significance at 1%, (b) at 5%, and (c) at 10%.
* Turning points derived from statistically significant estimates are in bold.
* Resource-rich dummy is dropped from Fixed-effects estimation due to collinearity.
Estimated threshold/turning point for 
government debt to GDP ratio (in %)*
Table 4:  Threshold estimation for the relationship of equity market index returns and government Debt-to-GDP ratio,  Random-effects vs Fixed-effects
Continuous-quarter returns
Dependent variables:
Index returns, continuous-quarter (from previous quarter) Index returns, continuous-quarter (from previous quarter)
Country with Balanced Budget Rule 
Figure 1: Stockmarket performance for selected markets  
                      
Sources: Datastream; Bloomberg; Authors’ calculations 
Note: CAGR refers to compound annual growth rate, which is calculated using formula: (VE/VB)1/T-1, where VE is end-of-
period index value, VB is beginning-period index value, and T equals 5.  
 
 
Figure 2: Average stockmarket index returns and average public debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank-International Monetary Fund, Quarterly Public Sector Debt Statistics 
Note: The figure presents a scatter plot of the average values of the year-on-year (y-o-y) returns of the equity market index 
and public debt-to-GDP ratio of the sample economies from the year 1995 to 2012.  
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Figure 3: Sovereign CDS Spread and stockmarket index returns for selected European 
peripheral economies in 2011 and 2012 
 Sources: Bloomberg 
 
 
Figure 4: Stockmarket index performance and Government Debt-to-GDP ratio 
 
Sources: Bloomberg; World Bank-International Monetary Fund, Quarterly Public Sector Debt Statistics. 
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